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Introduction
 Botnets are a serious security problem in todays Internet
– Spam, fraud, identity theft, malware hosting, DDoS, ...
– Anti botnet research is a big area of research
 Smartphone botnets
– Vulnerabilities exist in all major smartphone platforms
– Smartphones are powerful enough to host a bot
– Smartphone-based botnets would offer additional 
“financial” gains for a botmaster
 Therefore, smartphone botnets are likely to appear and thus 
need to be studied
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The iPhone iKee.B botnet
 Very simple botnet that is based on the iKee.A worm
– Abused the default root password of jailbroken iPhones
– Infected phones via ssh/scp
• No user interaction required! (first one!)
– Very simple HTTP-based C&C
• download a shell script with new commands
– Main payload was to steel SMS database
– November 2009
 References
Analysis of iKee.B [http://mtc.sri.com/iPhone/]
iKee.A [http://f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001814.html]
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Motivation
 Understand mobile botnets
– How will they work
– How to build one
– Identify “general weak spots”
 Operators need to prepare for mobile botnets
– Keep mobile network operational
– Filter fraud (nobody likes upset customers)
– Need to be able to detect and remove bots
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Goals
 Implement smartphone bot and botnet C&C
– Try different C&C schemas
– Implement payloads
 Evaluate botnet
– In test network (in test GSM network)
– On real network (manual install, not spreading!)
 Investigate detection possibilities
– Network side (mobile phone network)
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Command and Control (C&C)
 C&C is the most important part of a botnet
– Control channel for botmaster
– If channel can be blocked the botnet is dead
– Needs to be robust against attacks 
• by defenders (good guys) and other botmasters
 Challenges for mobile C&C
– Connectivity: Wifi vs. GSM/3G → changes in bandwidth
– Communication costs (GSM: SMS/data)
– Computational power
– Battery power
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Internet-based (IP-based) C&C
 C&C via IP/Internet
– Follow PC-based botnets using P2P
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GSM-based (SMS-based) C&C
 C&C via SMS/MMS
– Botmaster uses a phone to control the botnet
• Phone maybe hijacked
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Local Wireless C&C
 WiFi (AdHoc), Bluetooth
 Botmaster injects command and lets it travel through the net
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C&C Communication Costs
 Mobile phone service cost money
– SMS, packet-data, circuit switch data (CSD) calls, ...
 Costs could make a botnet detectable
– more easily, faster
 Need to analyze cost factor
– When designing a C&C system for a mobile botnet
– When building a detection system
 Interesting because of...
– Service plans
– Countries, roaming
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Mobile Botnet Payloads
 Mobile phones have abilities not found on desktop computers
– Modem
• Billing system
• Non-IP communication
– Data not found on desktop computer
– Special hardware such as a GPS
 Possibilities
– Unique kind of denial-of-Service attacks
– Unique kind of fraud
– Data / identify theft
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Data Theft
 Smartphone store many kinds of private information
– Addressbook
– Calendar
– Emails + account credentials
– SMS/MMS
– Voicecall records
– Photos
 Gain for botmaster
– Extortion (private)
– Identity theft (private)
– Industrial espionage (commercial)
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(D)Denial-of-Service Payloads
 Operator / Network
– DoS a single cell or cell area
– DoS MNO backend infrastructure [1]
 “Real World”
– DoS emergency number
– DoS company hotline (extortion)
– SMS flooding
[1] Trynor et al.: On cellular botnets: measuring the impact of 
malicious devices on a cellular network core, 16th ACM CCS
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Conclusions
 Bots on mobile phones pose some challenges
– Many possibilities for C&C
• A lot of work for the defenders
 Mobile bots offer unique possibilities to a botmaster
– Phone call / sms related fraud (easy)
– New interesting DoS attacks
 Smartphone botnets are interesting and a hot topic right now
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Thank you!
Questions?
